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Abstract
In this paper we want to shed some light on the empirical relevance of the new
economic geography. Using one of the central features of the core new
economic geography models, namely that wages have the tendency to fall the
further one moves away from centres of economic activity, we investigate the
existence of a spatial wage structure for post-unification Germany.  We find
support for a spatial wage structure for German city-district wages, and hence
indirectly for the relevance of a new economic geography model for Germany.
We also find that demand linkages in Germany are strongly localised and that
the “old” border still matters to the extent that economic interactions between
western and eastern Germany are still limited compared to the situation within
these two parts of Germany.
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Starting with the seminal contribution by Krugman (1991), the new economic geography has
been prominent on the research agenda in economics in recent years. The bulk of this research
is of a highly theoretical nature (see Fujita, Krugman and Venables, 1999). In this paper we
want to shed some light on the empirical relevance of the new economic geography. Using
one of the central features of the core new economic geography models, namely that wages
have the tendency to fall the further one moves away from centres of economic activity, we
investigate the existence of a spatial wage structure for post-unification Germany. Based on
the work of Hanson (1998) we do find clear evidence in favour of a spatial wage structure.
The principal aim of the paper is to establish whether or not a spatial wage structure exists for
Germany. The German case is interesting against the background of (the lack of) convergence
between western and eastern Germany following the fall of the wall. Despite the initial
optimism that prevailed following the German re-unification about the convergence prospects
between western and eastern Germany, it was quickly pointed out that this optimism was not
necessary in line with modern trade and growth theory (Siebert, 1991, 1999). Although some
convergence (in terms of gdp per capita) did took place in the period 1991-1995, the clear
lack of convergence since then indicates that the new economic geography model with its
emphasis on core-periphery outcomes might be of some relevance for post-unification
Germany. In fact, the new economic geography model was called upon to show that a so-
called Mezzogiorno scenario (with western Germany as the core and the former GDR as the
periphery) could not be ruled out for the German case (e.g. Brakman and Garretsen, 1993).
2
Others (for instance Sinn, 2000), however, pointed out that the neo-classical model is still
relevant for Germany, but that prices, wages and other market forces could not do their proper
job due to all kinds of distortions. This argument might be relevant, but then it also holds for
the new economic geography approach. In this approach market distortions could prevent
core-periphery patterns to become reality. What we try to do in this paper is to find out
whether or not the actual spatial wage pattern is consistent with the new economic geography
                                                                
1 We like to thank participants of seminars in Groningen (especially Paul de Grauwe), Nijmegen, Berlin and
Maastricht as well as participants of the CESifo seminar on November 6th 2000 in Munich for their comments.
2 A leading textbook on international economics , Krugman and Obstfeld’s International Economics (1994,
Third edition) uses the German re-unification as the example to explain the essentials of the new economic
geography.3
approach and is not the result of (random) distortions.  The present paper is our attempt to test
for a spatial wage structure in Germany and is also relevant given the ongoing debate about
the proper theory to analyse the convergence process in Germany.
The paper is organised as follows. In the next section we briefly discuss the various
approaches to test for (part of) the theory of the new economic geography. Our conclusion is
that the idea of a spatial wage structure offers a useful starting point to assess the empirical
relevance of the new economic geography approach. Section 3 deals with the data set and our
basic specification of the wage equation. The estimation results are discussed in section 4.
Section 5 concludes. In the Appendix to this paper we give some additional (and preliminary)
estimation results on the spatial wage structure based on a different model specification.
2.  How to Assess the Relevance of the New Economic Geography?
2.1.   The facts and economic theory
A by now vast amount of empirical research has shown that economic activity is not
distributed randomly across space. The agglomeration of economic activity can be observed at
various levels of aggregation (countries, regions or cities) and the geographical specialization
or concentration of industries is also widespread (see for instance Brülhart and Torstensson,
1996, for the EU). As for instance Brülhart (1998) in his survey of the empirical evidence
notes, the same empirical fact about specialisation or agglomeration can almost invariably be
explained by different theoretical approaches, i.e. standard trade theory or geography
approaches. At the one hand this is good news because it means that these are not facts in
search of theory so to say. At the other hand this state of affairs is not very satisfactory
because it does not answer the question as to the empirical relevance of individual theories
like the new economic geography.
This last point has, of course, not gone unnoticed in the literature and several studies try to
test for the relevance of one or more theories of location by investigating how much of the
observed specialisation or agglomeration can be ascribed to these theories. An example is the
study of the US city-size distribution by Black and Henderson (1999) where it is tested how
important scale externalities are in the formation of cities (to stimulate agglomeration) and
whether the actual geography and the characteristics of city-neighbours influence (changes in)
city-size. The first determinant is at home in modern neo-classical theory whereas the second4
set of characteristics describes variables in the modern theories of location, like the new
economic geography. It turns out that both sets of determinants are relevant; upward mobility
of cities (size-wise) is promoted by, a coastal location, a good climate and a location with a
high market-potential. In what can be seen as a follow-up to the development of the well-
known Ellison-Glaeser index of industry concentration, Dumais, Ellison and Glaeser (1997)
try to show how much of the observed industry concentration in the US is due to externalities.
They find evidence that lends support to one of these externalities, namely labour market
pooling, and therewith also indirectly find support for theories that rely on pecuniary external
economies like the new economic geography. This, however, does not mean that a neo-
classical foundation of the observed geographic concentration in the US is irrelevant in
principle. Ellison and Glaeser (1999, p. 315) estimate that approx. 20% of this concentration
can be explained by geographical advantages (=endowments). It seems that both types of
explanations are relevant: neo-classical and modern geography.
These and other “1st versus 2nd nature” (Krugman, 1993)  explanations do, however, not
offer a direct test of a particular theory, like the new economic geography or the neoclassical
model. They typically test for the significance of particular variables, like endowments,
economies of scale, scale externalities or specific characteristics of geography for the location
of economic activity. Although it can make certain theories look more plausible than others
do, this methodology does not discriminate between theories. For one thing, the significance
of some of these explanatory variables, for example the importance of transport cost for trade
between locations (countries), is consistent with the new economic geography model but also
with other approaches like an extended version of the standard neo-classical trade theory
(Deardorff, 1995). In general, it seems that many variables, which are important in the neo-
classical approach, also turn out to be crucial for modern models of economic geography. The
fundamental problem is that these studies still do not try to test directly for the relevance of
the underlying mechanisms that sets the modern theoretical approaches of location apart.
3
To elaborate upon this last important point, take for instance studies in which (in a reduced
form regression) some measure of industry concentration is regressed upon a set variables that
includes variables from various competing theories. A representative example of this
                                                                
3 This need not to be an issue if one is merely trying to explain the variable of interest (here industry
concentration) and wants to take all potentially relevant factors into account. For our present purposes it is,
however, troublesome because we want to assess the empirical relevance of a particular theory, the new
economic geography.5
approach is the study by Haaland et al (1999).  For a group of 13 European countries and 35
industries the concentration of each industry is regressed upon variables which are meant to
capture four different approaches to model international trade. Two variables (labour intensity
and human capital intensity of industry production) are used as proxies for the Heckscher-
Ohlin model, whereas technological differences between industries represent the Ricardian
trade model. Two modern (trade) theories, both the new trade model and the new economic
geography model, are proxied by the relative concentration of expenditures (=market size)
and a variable measuring economies of scale. A measure of intra-industry input-output
linkages is also included and thought to apply to the new economic geography model only.
The inclusion of a variable measuring trade costs completes the set of independent variables.
It turns out that neo-classical (e.g. human capital intensity) variables as well as “new”
variables (e.g. market size) are important determinants of the industry concentration in
Europe.
4 The basic problem with the approach followed in these kind of studies is aptly
summarised by Brülhart (1998) who argues that such a ”regression analysis of industry
concentration suggests that all major theoretical approaches are relevant. However they have
not been used to assess relative merits of competing models across industries or countries”
(Brülhart, 1998, p. 792). From the point of view of the new economic geography one might
add that another problem is that allegedly independent variables in some of these studies,
notably proxies for market size, are not independent because market size is determined by the
location of industries in the new economic geography approach. The difference between
endogenous and exogenous variables becomes even more difficult than usual.
5
So, in the former approach it is impossible to discriminate between different theoretical
approaches. As Krugman notes, in his survey of the new economic geography, empirical work
in the new economic geography has, similar to the new industrial organisation and new
growth literature, “failed to offer much direct testing of the specifics of the models”
(Krugman, 1998, p. 172). In his view the empirical work by Donald Davis and David
Weinstein (1996) on the so-called home market effect is an exception. In short, the home
market effect notes that producers of differentiated goods, under increasing returns to scale,
must choose a location for production; location in the larger region/country is preferred
because a larger share of sales can be carried out without incurring transportation costs.
Testing for a home market effect in production is obviously important from the perspective of
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5 This is also acknowledged by Haaland et al (1999), p. 9.6
the new economic geography because the home market effect is a crucial element of the core
new economic geography model. As for instance Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999, p. 57)
show in this core model an increase in demand for a region’s manufactured goods implies a
more-than-proportional increase in manufacturing production (assuming a perfect elastic
labour supply).
Davis and Weinstein have used country as well as regional data to establish the empirical
validity of the home market effect. Although Davis and Weinstein more directly test the new
economic geography approach, there are in our view still two basic problems using the home
market effect in testing for the relevance of the new theories. The first problem is that the
home market effect is not only at home in the new economic geography but also in the new
trade models like Krugman (1979, 1980). Since these new trade models, as opposed to the
new economic geography models, treat regional market size and demand as exogenous, and
assume no labour mobility across borders, a test for the home market effect is not able to
discriminate between the new trade theory and the new economic geography.
6  The second
problem with the use of the home market effect (see also Brülhart, 1998, p. 795) is that the
home market effect is not very robust. Davis (1998) in particular shows that the home market
effect does not arise if, as is usually assumed in the new economic geography models, not
only the trade of the differentiated goods but of all goods is subject to transportation costs.
To conclude, this brief discussion of the empirical literature on agglomeration suggests that a
proper empirical application of the new economic geography approach should include the
underlying mechanisms as they are described in the basic new economic geography models.
2.2 Testing for the Relevance of the New Economic Geography: The Spatial Wage Structure
Testing for the home market effect is a first step in testing the new economic geography
approaches, it also does point to another, and in our view, more promising method to test for
the empirical relevance of the new economic geography. The extent to which an increase in a
region’s demand for a manufactured good translates into a (more than proportional) increase
in that region’s production of the good depends on the elasticity of labour supply in the core
new economic geography model.  If labour supply is not perfectly elastic the increased
demand will not only lead to increased production but also to higher nominal wages in that
region.  Hence, given the (reasonable) assumption that labour supply is not perfectly elastic, is7
interesting to see whether regions with a relatively high demand for manufactures also pay
relatively higher wages.
7 Or to put more simply, is it the case, as the new economic geography
model predicts, that, ceteris paribus, wages fall the further one moves away from centers of
economic activity?
The negative relationship between manufacturing wages in a location and the distance of that
location from the center(s) of production does set the new economic geography apart from the
neo-classical and new trade theory. In the neo-classical trade theory there is no foundation for
such a spatial wage structure. The existence of economic centers can be rationalised by
location-specific endowments but this does not imply a spatial wage structure. Even with
(endowment-driven) agglomeration, the main prediction of the neo-classical trade theory is
that trade will lead to factor price equalisation. In the new trade models, again see for instance
Krugman (1980) and its two-region model, it is true that wages are higher for the country with
the larger labour force but in the analysis of the home market effect, wages are equalised
between the two regions (Krugman, 1980). Wage equalisation follows from the fact that each
country specialises in the production of certain varieties of the manufactured good, which
results in a concentration of the production certain varieties in one country and the
concentration of the remaining varieties in the other country. As opposed to the new economic
geography approach, a spatial wage structure is therefore ruled out in new trade models
building on Krugman (1980) because there is no agglomeration of manufacturing production
across space and thus no possibility of a center(s) of manufacturing production.
8
Using US county-data Gordon Hanson (1998, 1999) investigates if there is empirical evidence
that supports the idea of a spatial wage structure. He performs two tests. The first one, in
which he estimates a spatial wage equation, is the reduced form of the long-run equilibrium in
Helpman’s (1998) extension of the Krugman (1991) model. And by doing so he is the first
one who uses the equilibrium conditions from the new economic geography model directly in
empirical research. The main conclusion is that there is strong evidence in favour of such a
wage structure.
9 Although this method is very attractive from a methodological point of view,
it has also several drawbacks. First, in order to derive an applicable form of the equilibrium
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
6 See Fujita, Krugman and Venables, 1999, p. 59 for what is essentially a similar observation.
7 In fact this description characterizes the short-run equilibrium of the new economic geography model
8 This point also holds for the Davis and Weinstein studies of the home market effect, they deal with
specialization of production.    
9 Using a different approach a similar conclusion is reached for Mexican regional wages in Hanson (1997)8
wage equation, Hanson has to assume that real wages are equalised. This means that he
implicitly assumes that the actual spatial wage distribution is also a long-run equilibrium,
which more often than not will not be the case. Second, one has to find estimates for the
parameters in the Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition model, of which Fujita, Krugman
and Venables (1999, p. 45) say; "that (it) is grossly unrealistic, …, (and) leads to special but
very suggestive set of results". In a qualitative sense the model is indeed very suggestive, but
hardly provides an adequate description of the real world.
These and other difficulties have led Hanson to a second specification of the spatial wage
equation, which is an approximation of the nominal wage equation in the Krugman (1991)
model. This equation is similar to the well-known concept of market potential function from
the “old” economic geography, however, one should bear in mind that we are discussing a
spatial wage equation and not a spatial demand equation or some other trade variable. This is
what is new in the Hanson approach.  Hanson’s starting point is “that the level of economic
activity in a location is conditioned by that location’s access to market for its goods. While
this view may seem narrow- it ignores climate, natural resource supplies, and other factors
which surely influence city location-I attempt to show that market access provides a useful
way to characterise the forces that contribute to the geographic concentration of economic
activity “  (Hanson, 1998, p.1, emphasis added).
The reference to the market potential function is not coincidental, Krugman (1995, p. 99)
already observed that the equilibrium condition for the nominal wage equation in the new
economic geography model, in a qualitative sense, closely resembles a market potential
function as introduced by Harris (1954).  In the core new economic geography model, the
nominal wage equation can be looked upon as a spatial labour demand function to the extent
that wages (and hence labour demand) in a region are higher, the nearer this region is to areas
with a high demand for this region’s products. Hanson (1998), therefore, considers the
market-potential function as a “reduced form” of the nominal wage equation from the core
new economic geography model. So he uses the market-potential function as the empirical
specification to estimate the spatial wage structure for the US (see also section 4 below). This
is also the method we use in this paper, because we can avoid the difficult task to estimate
parameters in a grossly unrealistic Dixit-Stiglitz model. Furthermore, it is very likely that the
actual spatial wage distribution in Germany is not a long-run equilibrium only 10 years after9
the unification and therefore the equilibrium condition of the wage equation is not relevant for
our purpose (see however the Appendix)
10.
3.  The German Case and the Data Set
Our purpose is to test for a spatial wage structure in Germany. Compared to for instance the
USA, the German case creates several challenges. First of all, unlike the USA Germany is
typically to be considered as an open economy. To test for a spatial wage structure, one has to
take economic activity from abroad into account. Second, the labour market in Germany is
considered to be rigid. If one detects a spatial wage structure, despite this institutional set up,
then that would mean a clear case in favour of the agglomeration dynamics, which are
described by the models of the new economic geography. Third, also typical of the German
case are, of course, the differences between the western and eastern economy. Nominal wages
are lower in the east than in the west, due to a lower labour productivity (see Sinn (2000), p.
19). Moreover, East German firms face severe difficulties entering interregional, West
German, markets. Despite the relatively high unit labour costs in east Germany, producer
prices are estimated to be 20% lower than West German producer prices for equivalent
products (see Müller, 1999). Market segmentation between East and West Germany is thus
something to take into account as well. We will return to the issue of segmentation below.
Before we turn to the estimation results, we first briefly discuss our data set. Germany is
administratively divided into about 440 districts (Kreise)
11. Of these districts a total of 118
districts are so called city-districts (kreisfreie Stadt), in which the district corresponds with a
city. We use district statistics provided by the regional statistical offices in Germany. The data
set contains local variables like the value added of all sectors (GDP), the wage bill, number of
hours of labour in firms, with 20 or more employees, in the mining and manufacturing sector.
In the empirical analysis we restrict our sample to the more homogeneous group of city-
districts. We have data for 114 city-districts, of which 26 are East German, and this group of
districts represents 47% of total German GDP and about 40% total German urban
population.
12 In the new economic geography approach transport costs are a crucial variable.
                                                                
10 In the Appendix we present, however, some preliminary estimation results of the long-run equilibrium wage
equation in Germany, which provide estimates of the structural ‘German’ parameters in the basis new economic
geography model.
11 In terms of the NUTS-classification the districts are the regions of NUTS level 3.
12 A country-district contains several towns and villages and the average population density in country districts is
8.4% of the average population density in city-districts. For some other studies that estimate market potential
function with urban areas as the geographical unit, see Hanson (1998, p.X). We did also ran our regressions for10
We do not use the geodesic distance between city-districts because this measure does not
distinguish between highways and secondary roads; here distance is measured by the average
number of minutes of travel by car. The data are obtained with the Route Planner 2000
(Europe, And Publishers, Rotterdam). Since we have one observation per city district for the
average hourly wage and for GDP (1994/1995) we estimate this wage equation in levels.











=a+a Œœ ºß ￿    (1)
where wj is the nominal hourly wage in city-district j, Yj is the value added of all sectors in
city-district j, djk is the distance between city-districts  j and k with distance measured in
minutes of travel by car.
4.  Estimation Results
4.1 Spatial Wage Equations
The estimation of equation (1) serves two purposes. First and foremost, we want to find out if
at the city-district level spatial nominal wages in Germany depend positively on the proximity
of large and nearby markets for its products. So, we want to find out if a spatial wage
structure indeed exists. Secondly, we want to establish whether and how the results are
changed when some important characteristics of the German economy are taken into account.
The first column of Table 1 gives the estimation results for equation (1).  The main conclusion
is that for Germany as a whole (here, 114 city-districts) we find strong confirmation of the
relevance of a spatial wage structure. The coefficients a1 and a2 are both significantly
different from zero and notably distance clearly matters. Wages in city-district j depend
positively on the economic activity and the resulting demand from other city-districts (a1 is
positive) but the impact of this demand on wages in city-district j is localised (a2 is positive).
Or, in other words, the results confirm the idea that wages will be higher when a city-district
is close to or part of an economic center (i.e. a clustering of districts with relatively high Y).
One rather obvious criticism of applying equation (1) to post-unification Germany is that the
nominal wages in the mining and manufacturing sector in East Germany were about 35%
lower than in West Germany in 1995 (Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland).  In order to
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
the larger sample (city- and country-districts) but this not change the main results, so we’ll stick to the sample of11
account for this east/west wage differential, a dummy for East German city-districts is added











=a+a+ Œœ ºß ￿ (2)
The second column of Table 1 shows that the main conclusions about the spatial wage
structure remain unchanged. Coefficient a3 is equal to -.23, which indicates that 23 percentage
points of the east/west wage gap of 35% in 1995 is explained by exogenous factors and one
third of the east/west wage gap could be looked upon as the result of the geographical
distribution of economic activity in Germany.
Another feature of the German economy that may have a bearing on the results is that
equation (1) assumes that Germany is a closed economy. Germany’s main trading partners are
the other member states of the European Union (EU). Adding the market access to these 14











=a++a+ Œœ ºß ￿￿ (3)
where djEU is the distance (measured in minutes of travel by car) between the German city-
district j and the capital of the EU Member State EU, YEU is defined as the GDP of Member
State EU multiplied
13 by the ratio GDP of all German city-districts to German GDP.
As can be seen from the third column of Table 1 the recognition of the openness of the
German economy does not give rise to different results. There is hardly any change in the
coefficients estimated. This result does not imply that the wages of city-districts that are
relatively close to (some of) these EU-countries would not benefit from the inclusion of the
EU-countries. However, we estimated a specification of equation (3) (not reported here), in
which we allowed for two separate distance parameters: one for the pairs “city-district i, city-
district j” and one for the pairs “city district i, capital of Member State EU”. The latter
remained statistically insignificant. So the spatial wage structure does not seem to be affected
by economic activity abroad. To sum up, the results in Table 1 clearly illustrate the presence
of  a spatial wage structure in Germany.
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
114 city-districts in the remainder of the paper.
13 To account for the fact that not all of the economic activity in Germany is considered in the empirical analysis.12
Table 1 Estimation Results of Hourly Wage in German Districts (1995)
(Nonlinear Least Squares)
Basic wage-equation
               (1)
Wage-equation with dummy for
East German districts
                        (2)
Open-economy wage-equation























Adj. R² 0.458 0.526 0.526
Obs. 114 114 114
The t-statistics are in parentheses.
4.2 Border Effects
Given the potential relevance of border effects for post-unification Germany, we now turn to
the question whether distance is less relevant within East or West Germany than between East
and West Germany. Or in other words, is the former border between the former Federal
Republic of Germany and German Democratic Republic, still discernible to the extent that it












=b+b+ Œœ ºß ￿ (2’)
where  jjk=0, if j=East (West) German city-district and k =East (West) German city-district
 jjk=1, if j=east (west) German city district and k=West (East) German city-district.13
We should expect, following studies like Engel and Rogers (1996) or McCallum (1995), that
if border effects occur between East and West Germany then b3 is positive, thereby enlarging
the distance parameter. However, as can be seen from the empirical results in column (1) of
Table 2 the distance parameters b3 is negative and, moreover, b2 and b3 cancel out if jjk=1.
14
What do these results with respect to the two distance parameters imply in our view?
First of all, b3 has the wrong sign. So in this sense no border effect is observed.
Secondly, for jjk=0 the distance parameter b2 is lower compared to what we found in the
estimations shown in Table1 (0.131 compared to 0.170). A reason for the relatively high value
for the distance parameter in Table 1 might indeed simply be that we have pooled two groups
of city-districts, east and west German districts, whose markets are still segmented 5 years
after the re-unification. If this is the case the pooled estimate for the distance parameter will
be biased upwards. The estimation results for jjk=0 confirm this. When we thus confine our
estimations to only either West or East German city-districts (i.e. with jjk=0), distance clearly
still matters but its impact is less for city-district wages (a coefficient of 0.13 compared to
0.17 for the full sample). So in this respect demand linkages are geographically stronger
within either part of Germany than between these two parts of Germany. As such our results
are consistent with the so-called home bias effect in trade, which says that (here,
interregional) goods markets appear to be far more segmented than is commonly supposed. So
our research confirms the theoretical notion of Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) that transportation
costs are a possible explanation for this phenomenon.
Thirdly, the fact that b2 and b3 cancel out when jjk=1 indicates that the spatial distribution of
demand/economic activity in West (East) Germany is not relevant for the spatial wage
structure in East (West) Germany.  This means that in East Germany the geographical
distribution of city-district wages is not influenced by the proximity of the city-districts to the
economic centres in West Germany and vice versa. This result does, therefore, indicate that
the East-West German border still matters to the extent that there does not seem to be an
effect of the localisation of East (West) German demand for the wages of West (East)
German city-districts.
15 Or, stated differently, for the level of East German city-district wages
only the total West German demand (SY) matters and vice versa. Here, we essentially find
                                                                
14 The F-statistic of the Wald-test of the restriction b2+b3=0 is 1.15. So the sum of the two distance parameters is
not statistically significantly different from zero.14
that for East (West) German wages the geography within West (East) Germany is next to
irrelevant. How can this finding be explained?  We can only offer some suggestions here. The
strong segmentation of East and West German markets could be caused by differences in
company behaviour because of differences in management style and willingness to adjust to
changes in the company environment (see Rothfels and Wölfl (1998), p. 7-11). The existence
of mental borders between the Ossies and Wessies might be relevant. In this case economic
agents impose borders on themselves for instance because they strongly identify with “their”
region and are inclined to stick to this region for their economic transactions. Another
possibility, which might be relevant in the initial stage of the German re-unification, is that
agents simply lack knowledge about the other region and are therefore geographically biased
when it comes to their economic transactions (Van Houtum, 1998).
To check whether this third result is merely a statistical artefact, columns (2) and (3) of Table
2 give the estimation results of estimating equation (2’) for different “borders”.  The first
alternative border-assumption comes through a division of Germany as a whole in a northern
and southern part (see the second column Table 2). This gives us 26 northern and 88 southern
city-districts. The second border comes about by splitting West Germany in 15 northern and
73 southern city-districts (see the third column Table 2). The main point is that for  these
additional two border assumptions the coefficient b3 becomes insignificant and the inclusion
of borders is therefore immaterial to the estimation results thereby indicating that the only
border that (still) mattered in the mid 1990s was the one between the former GDR and FRG.
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
15 Note that this border effect is quite different from the border effect found by e.g. Engel and Rogers (1996) for
the US and Canada. They find that the US-Canada border is powerful in introducing large variations in the
movements of prices.15
Table 2 Estimation Results of Hourly Wage in German Districts and Intra-Germany Border (1995)
(Nonlinear Least Squares)































Adj. R² 0.472 0.522 0.376
Obs. 114 114 88
The t-statistics are in parentheses.
4.3. Wage Effects of improvements of the infrastructure between eastern and western
Germany
At the time of the unification, July 1, 1990, it was clear that the infrastructure in eastern
Germany had been neglected. Since then a sizeable share of the financial aid of the federal
government has been, and still is, directed towards investments in the infrastructure. This has
resulted in a substantial reduction of travel time in (eastern) Germany (see Eckey & Horn,
2000). Given the importance of transport cost in the model discussed above, one might ask,
what are the consequences of a further decrease in transport costs? Table 3, presents the
results on local nominal wages of a 15%-decrease in transport time, which is reasonable in the
light of earlier findings (see Eckey & Horn, 2000). All 26 East German districts and only 5 of
the 89 West German districts seem to be affected. In general, local nominal wage increases.
However, this effect of the decrease in transport costs is only significant for West Berlin; the
economic centre of eastern Germany.16
Table 3 Change in nominal wage because of a shock in transport costs
(15%-decrease in time of travel between East German districts and West German districts)
Relative change in
nominal wage (Dlog(wj))











Hof (West Germany) 0.00058 0.00070








East Berlin 0.00007 0.00007
Cottbus 0.00004 0.00007
Dresden 0.00002 0.00004
Frankfurt (Oder) 0.00002 0.00005
Braunschweig (West Germany) 0.00001 0.00002




































a a , where the numerator  on the RHS represents the sum of all
discounted GDP’s in East German districts, if district j is West German, and the sum of all discounted GDP’s in
West German districts, if district j is East German;  2 1 ˆ   , ˆ a a  are the nonlinear least-squares estimates reported in
Column (2) of Table 1.
4.4. Wage Effects of a Demand Shock in Essen
Given the central role of the distance parameter in the above analysis of the spatial wage
structure for Germany, we finally turn our attention to the question how a demand shock in a
particular region affects the regional pattern of wages in the German city-districts. Based on
Hanson (1998, 1999) the following experiment was conducted: the GDP of city-district Essen17
in the Ruhrgebiet area was increased by 10% and we then checked what this implied for
wages in our 114 city-districts. It is here that the localised nature of demand linkages in
Germany comes to the fore. Table 4 shows the results for the city-districts that are nearest to
Essen. The GDP shock leads (not surprisingly) to the largest wage increase in Essen itself
(wages on Essen increase by 2.3%). As one moves away from Essen the magnitude of the
wage increase quickly gets smaller. Travelling more than one hour by car one arrives at city-
districts whose nominal wages are not affected anymore by the GDP shock. This result shows
that the effect of a local demand shock on wages is geographically rather limited. For
example, Hanson (1999, p. 20), performing a similar experiment for the USA, finds that a
local demand shock still has an effect on the nominal wage in a county at a distance of 885
kilometers. Hence, the demand-linkages are indeed strongly localised for the case of Germany
compared to the USA.
Table 4 Change in nominal wage because of an increase in economic activity in Essen of 10%





Minutes of travel by car
with destination Essen
Essen 0.02271 0.00042 0
Mülheim an der Ruhr 0.00753 0.00215 9
Oberhausen 0.00652 0.00206 10
Bottrop 0.00610 0.00211 11
Gelsenkirchen 0.00582 0.00201 11
Bochum 0.00444 0.00180 13
Duisburg 0.00383 0.00167 14
Herne 0.00355 0.00165 15
Düsseldorf 0.00083 0.00063 25
Dortmund 0.00094 0.00071 25
Krefeld 0.00041 0.00039 32
Wuppertal 0.00039 0.00038 32
Hagen 0.00032 0.00033 34
Solingen 0.00025 0.00027 36
Leverkusen 0.00020 0.00022 37
Remscheid 0.00013 0.00016 41
Mönchengladbach 0.00009 0.00011 44
Köln 0.00004 0.00006 47
Hamm 0.00003 0.00005 52
Münster 0.00001 0.00002 5918
Bonn 0.00001 0.00002 60

















, where region 1 is Essen, and  123 ˆˆˆ , ,  bbb are the nonlinear least-
squares estimates reported in the first column of Table 2.
One might argue that the results shown in Table 4 are to be expected because of the relatively
small GDP of a single city-district like Essen.  To check for this, we conducted the same
experiment but now for the Regierungsbezirk Düssseldorf which consists of 10 city-districts.
16
Again, it turned out that the impact of the demand shock on the wages of other city-districts is
at best very limited
5.  Conclusions
In this paper we have tried to establish whether a spatial wage structure might be relevant to
describe the economic situation in post-unification Germany. If such a spatial wage pattern
exists this is indirect evidence in favour of the new economic geography approach because in
this approach wages are higher for regions which have easy access to relatively larger
markets. Although it is very difficult to estimate the equilibrium conditions of the new
economic geography model directly, we find support for a spatial wage structure for German
city-district wages, and hence indirectly for the relevance of a new economic geography
model for Germany. We also find that demand linkages in Germany are strongly localised and
that the “old” border still matters to the extent that economic interactions between western
and eastern Germany are still limited compared to the situation within these two parts of
Germany. Although we did not test against the alternative hypothesis of the relevance of a
neoclassical model, our estimations results for a spatial wage structure for German city-
district wages are at least consistent the view that the new economic geography model matters
for Germany.
                                                                
16 These city-districts are: Düssseldorf, Essen, Duisburg, Krefeld, Mönchengladbach, Mülheim, Oberhausen,
Remscheid, Solingen and Wuppertal.19
Appendix: Reduced form of the long-run equilibrium in the new economic geography
model in Germany
We argued in the main text of this paper that the long-run equilibrium is not appropriate for
Germany, especially since the Unification in 1990. However, if we do use this (somewhat
unrealistic) assumption of long-run equilibrium, we are able to do an empirical exercise,
which yields structural German parameters of the new economic geography model. What are
the results of this exercise (for more details we refer to Brakman, Garretsen, van Marrewijk
and Schramm, 2000)?




e -e e- Øø = ºß ￿ , (4)
in which w is the wage rate, Y is income, I is the price index of manufacturing goods, e is the
Dixit-Stiglitz elasticity of substitution, T is the transport cost parameter, and 
jk D
jk T T = , where
Djk is the distance between locations j and k; transport costs T    is of the iceberg-type and
defined as the number of goods that have to be shipped in order to ensure that one unit arrives
over one unit of distance.
As there are no time series available on price index  I at the local level, Hanson rewrites
equation (1) by assuming that the equilibrium real wages are equal between regions (long-run






-e -e+-ed-de-de-d =+e ￿ , (5)
where k0 is a constant, Hk is the housing stock in region k, and d is the share of income spent
on manufactures. Note that equation (2) includes the three structural parameters of the core
model, namely part of income spent on manufactures, d, the substitution elasticity, e and the
transport costs, T.
                                                                
17 By applying the Helpman’s (1998) extension of the Krugman (1991) model, Hanson can get rid of the
unobservable I  and introduce the observable variable of the local housing stock. To get from wage equation (4)
to equation (5) use (i) the equilibrium for the housing market:  j j j Y H P ) 1 ( d - =  (the value of the fixed stock of
housing equals the part of income spent on housing), where H is the housing stock, P is the price of housing, d is20
For the estimation of the structural parameters of the model we extend the sample of 114 city-
districts with 37 aggregated country districts, constructed using 326 German country districts.
The total number of districts in our sample is thus 151. The extra explanatory variable of the
housing stock is represented by the total local stock of rooms in residential dwellings.
Accounting for the productivity gap between East and West Germany and the two types of
districts, city and country districts, we add two dummies to wage equation (5): a dummy
which is 1 for East German districts and 0 otherwise and a dummy which is 1 for a country
district and 0 otherwise. As the estimates of the coefficients of the two dummies are
immaterial for the conclusions with respect to the structural parameters they are not reported
here.
Table 5 Estimating the structural parameters for Germany
Coefficient standard error t-statistic
d 1.869 0.887 2.105
e 3.914 0.618 6.327
Log(T) 0.008 0.001 7.257
Adj. R
2 = 0.481; number of observations = 151; non-linear least squares
*Standard error
Table 3 reveals a spatial wage structure in Germany: T is significantly positive. One can also
observe the substitution elasticity e. The point estimate indicates that the price markup over
marginal costs is 34% in the manufacturing sector. Less satisfactory is the estimate of d.
Regression results indicate that a large part of German income is spent on manufacturing
goods. In fact, more than total income is spent on these type of goods. However, d  does not
significantly exceed 1.
Instead of estimating d, we can also use existing information about this share of income. We
consulted statistical information on German expenditure shares, which is relatively easy to
obtain. The appropriate d can be chosen either as 1 - 0.32002, with 0.32002 being the part of
income spent on non-tradable services, see panel a of Table 4, or as 1 - 0.17153, with 0.17153
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
the part of income spent on manufacturing goods, and (ii) real wage equalization between regions:
d d d d
k k k j j j I P W I P W
- - =
1 1 / / .21
being the part of income spend on non-tradable housing services, see panel b of Table 4.
18 We
thus estimate equation (5) again, restricting the parameter d to either of the two values above.
The results are reported in panels a and b of Table 6.
Table 6 Structural parameters for Germany, restricting d
Panel a. d = 0.67998 = 1- share spend on non-tradable services
Coefficient standard error t-statistic
 e 2.876 0.276 10.409
Log(T) 0.009 0.001 7.278
Adj. R
2 = 0.455; number of observations = 151; non-linear least squares
Panel b. d = 0.82847 = 1- share spend on housing services
Coefficient standard error t-statistic
 e 3.100 0.318 9.734
Log(T) 0.009 0.001 7.568
Adj. R
2 = 0.465; number of observations = 151; non-linear least squares
*Standard error
As is clear from Table 6, restricting the part of income spent on manufactures to 0.68 or 0.82
reduces the estimated elasticity of substitution between manufacturing varieties from almost 4
to roughly 3, and thus increases the estimated mark-up over marginal costs from 1/3 to ½.
19
The restrictions have virtually no impact on the estimated size and significance of the
transport costs T.
                                                                
18 Based on the weights in the German CPI, February 1999, Federal Statistical Office Germany
19 A 50%-markup may seem rather high. However, Hall (1988) measuring the markup in US industry arrives at a
markup of 120%, 106% and 210% in the construction, durable goods and nondurable goods sectors, respectively.22
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